Comparative Trade-Mark Rights in Common Law and Civil Law by Conover, Milton
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 1 Article 2 
1953 
Comparative Trade-Mark Rights in Common Law and Civil Law 
Milton Conover 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Conover, Milton (1953) "Comparative Trade-Mark Rights in Common Law and Civil Law," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 29 : No. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol29/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
COMPARATIVE TRADE-MARK RIGHTS IN
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
MILTON CONOVER*
pROGRESS in both research and the teaching of Comparative
. Law after World War I resulted in a multiplicity of schol-
astic dividends for both the practicing attorney and the aca-
demic jurisprudent. These were especially conspicuous where
the comparative studies comprehended problems involving both
the Common Law and the Civil Law. In Trade-mark Law
these values proclaimed possibilities of a more adequte sub-
stantive law, of keener interpretative refinements in the applic-
ation of substantive law in the different levels of the judicial
hierarchy; and of a more subtle appreciation of the similarity
in the results of various tests of trade-mark rights in the two
species of jurisprudence.
These values have a utilitarian interest for the independent
practicing attorney in the smaller rural hamlet and for the in-
ternational lawyer in the commercial world metropolis. The use
of trade-marks for separate crops of farmers in remote, agricul-
tural areas; for small business enterprises in provincial localities;
and, for urban corporations in world market centers has increased
trade-mark legal service in state, national and international pol-
ities. In the United States the use of trade-marks in business has
increased quite steadily ever since 1870, when the first annual
registration of trade-marks in the U.S. Patent Office totaled 121
specimens. In 1951, there were 17,869 new trade-marks regis-
tered besides 3,437 renewals and 1,589 republications. These
17,869 new registrations composed the greatest number of trade-
marks ever registered in any year in the United States, and it
reflected an increase of 9% over the preceding year. It brought
the total trade-mark registration in United States history to near-
ly 500,000 besides registration for slogans and other forms of
advertising that have become so integral a constituent of the
television age. For adjudication in 1951, the patent office enter-
tained 1375 cases.1
Considering the global distribution of many thousands of
American trade-marked commodities into the remote localities
under many flags, one may contemplate the world significance
0 Sc.D. Presently on the faculty of Seton Hall University, South Orange, N.J.
1. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents, 1951, pp. 5, 8.
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of the individual rights involved in the simplest trade-mark, the
need for the protection of their rights, and the rights of the
public against trade-mark imitation. These rights establish the
raison d'etre of trade-mark law, and the responsibility of law-
yers.
World history promises no surcease in the growth of trade-
mark law. Indeed, trade-marks were an integral factor in social
living long before Aristotle expostulated the obvious fact that
man is a social animal. That trade-marks existed three mill-
eniums prior to written history-as early as 6000 B.C.-is evi-
dent from ancient relics. The Oriental Institute of the Univer-
sity of Chicago maintains abundant evidences that Confuscius
had some grounds for saying that "Signs and symbols rule the
world-not words nor laws" alone. Signs and symbols speak to
those who cannot read words nor hear laws when they are
read. Thus trade-marks.
Although in early England, trade-mark regulation was not
regarded as the law of antiquity in the same sense as those laws
that were noted in the mediaeval Year Books, in Bracton and
in Glanvil-yet trade-marks were regulated in England by the
Guilds prior to the first trade-mark case at law in 1452. There-
after the common law and equity served progressively in trade-
mark usage.
In the United States, the common law as amplified by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution and by subsequent Con-
gressional statutes pursuant thereto culminating in the Lanham
Act of 1946 furnished the legal foundations for American trade-
mark adjudication. Synchronomously with increased trade-mark
registration in the United States, legislative adjustments on state,
national and international levels were contemplated by exper-
ienced publicists and jurists. State statutes were attentive to local
registration of trade-marks. Uniform State Laws were essayed
by the sagacious Edward S. Rogers and published posthumously
in Law and Contemporary Problems in 1948 nearly a half-cen-
tury after he had interested Hugo Munsterberg in the psychol-
ogy of marketing and after his own study of The Unwary Pur-
chaser had appeared in the Michigan Law Review in 1910. The
Lanham Act of July 5, 1946,2 apparently rendered less formid-
able the "brooding omnipresence" of the Supreme Court deci-
sion-in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' with its implicit deference to state
2. 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law, and set the national perspective for wider ranges of con-
gressional action in trade-mark regulation.4 An International Un-
iform Trade-mark Law was considered probable by the Trade-
Mark Reporter in May, 1952, while the International Trade-
Mark Office at Geneva, Switzerland, served twenty countries.
So, P. 0. Hereward's Handbook on Trade-Mark Laws Through-
out the World, 1951, was a welcome addition to similar works
by Singer Berthold, S. P. Ladas, and John H. Rueger.
In France the "Marques de falbriques obligatories" also
were a mediaeval institution-a case of imitation arising as early
as 1564. During the nationalizing tendencies of the Napolenic
period, a general tort liability for unfair competition in trade-
mark usage was assured the future by the Civil Code of 1804,
which states that "Any act by which a person causes damage to
another makes the person by whose fault the damage occurred
liable to make reparation for such damage." The Act of July
24, 1824, "Concerning the Alteration of Names of Manufactured
Goods" provided penalties for misbranding, but the Act of June
23, 1857, "Concerning Trade-Marks" established property rights
in trade-marks, and the basic provisions for current adjudica-
tion, although it has been supplemented by subsequent detailed
legislation and administrative decrees--e.g. the Regulatory De-
cision No. 200 of March 1, 1944, issued by the Comite general
d' organisation du commerce' providing minute details in the
general area of unfair competition of which trade-mark infringe-
ment is a species; and the Decree of June 12, 1946 which applies
specifically to "the national mark of quality."5
In mediaeval Germany, the "Produtionsmark Zeichen" was
recognized, and the Trade-Mark on iron and steel was an indus-
trial phenomenom by 1571-three hundred years before the Ger-
man unification under Chancellor Bismarck rendered inevitable
the German Civil Code of 1896, effective January 1, 1900. This
included the famous sections 138 and 826, which have been much
cited since the World Wars. Section 138 provides that "Trans-
actions which are contra bonos mores shall be null and void."
4. See Lunford, Trademarks and Unfair Competition-The Demise of Erie v. Tompkins?,
40 Trade-Mark Reporter 169-183 (1950); Giles, Unfair Competition and the Over-
extension of the Erie Doctrine, 41 Trade-Mark Reporter 1056-1059 (1951).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the codes, statutes and cases quoted in this
essay are from a sixteen-volume mimeograph compilation of material including translation
from the French and German into English, along with commentaries, prepared by Messrs.
Jervey, Deak, Wolf and Chait "for the confidential use of students in Comparative Law
at the Columbia University School of Law" and released by them in 1949 under the
Caption "Cases on Legal Controls on Competitive Practices in England, France, Germany
and the United States."
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Section 826 provides that "Any person who wilfully causes dam-
ages to another in a manner contra bonos mores shall be liable
for damages." The Code of Commerce followed in 1897, the. Un-
fair Competition Statute in 1909, and the comprehensive German
Trademark Statute in 1936. The Unfair Competition Statute of
June 7, 1909, further implemented the Civil Code caution regard-
ing transactions contra bonos mores, and suggested the confu-
sion test in trade-mark adjudication in that Section 16 of the
Statute stipulated that "An action for injunction shall be against
any person who in the course of business uses the name, firm-
name or other distinctive designation of a business or ptibli-
cation in a manner calculated to cause confusion with a name,
firm-name or other distinctive designation lawfully used by an-
other," and added that "An action for damages shall lie if such
person knew or should have known that the unlawful use Was
calculated to create confusion."
The German Trademark Statute of May 5, 1936, is cited in
many cases as WZG, meaning the Warenzeichengesetz. This
statute is comparable to the French Statute of 1857 and the
American Lanham Act of 1946. It permits the confusion test
to be carried into a deception test in that Section 4 of the Waren-
zeichengesetz provides that "Registration shall be denied to
marks which cause danger of deception," etc. Accordingly, Sec-
tion 11 stipulates that "A third person may move for cancella-
tion of a trade mark," if it should "cause danger of deception."
In the legal foundations of the United States, England and
the civil law countries, there is detected a basic distinction in
trade-mark rights. In the United States the right to register a
trade-mark is based on a prior usage of it. In England, the regis-
tration itself assures that right. In the civil law of France and
Germany, the trade-mark itself is considered as a property right.
Also, in the United States under the Lanham Act, a trade-mark
may be considered as abandoned after two years of disuse.
In civil law Germany, the trade-mark may be held in reserve
as a "defensive mark" or a "contingent mark" for many years as
a property right whether used or not. With this ,caveat in mind
however, the trade-mark laws of those countries afford ready
comparison-with some contrasts-in their basic dynamics and
in their several adjudications.
In the judicial administration of the trade-mark laws in
the several countries there may be detected valuable compari-
sons of substantial realities on each level of the judicial hier-
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archy, with their shadings of interpretation to fit the neat dis-
tinction of fact in trade-mark problems in protection of the rights
of the owner of the trade-mark and of the rights of the consum-
er public. The appeal procedure under the civil law of France
and Germany is much as that in the United States, where trade-
mark cases may proceed from the U.S. Patent Office to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, to the Federal
District Courts or the Circuit Courts of Appeal; and thence to
the Supreme Court of the United States. In France and Ger-
many, the adjudication machinery in 1951 remained about as it
was in 1936 when it was described by Professor Francis Deak
and Professor Max Rheinstein in their study of The Machinery
of Law Administration in France and Germany.' In France,
trademark affairs might proceed from the conseils des prud' hom-
mes to the tribunal civil, thence to appeal to the cour d' appel,
thence on review to the cour de eassation-where formerly they
would have review in the chambres des requetes, since abolished.
In Germany the procedure is similar, trade-mark matters pro-
ceeding from the Amtgericht to the Landgericht, thence on ap-
peal to the Oberlandesgericht and on review to the Reichsger-
icht, which, however, seems not to have met between May 5,
1945, and 1952.
6. 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 846-876 (1936).
